Requirements and Desirable Features of U.S. Federal Cryptographic Key Management Systems

NIST is developing a NIST Special Publication 800-152 entitled "A Profile for U. S. Federal Cryptographic Key Management Systems (CKMS)" for use by Federal agencies and contractors when designing, implementing, procuring, installing, configuring, and operating a CKMS. This Profile will be based on the NIST Special Publication 800-130 entitled "A Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key Management Systems." The Framework covers topics that should be considered by a product or system designer when designing a CKMS and specifies requirements for the design and its documentation. The Profile, however, will cover not only a CKMS design, but also its procurement, installation, management, and operation throughout its lifetime. Requirements will, therefore, be placed not only on a CKMS product or system, but also on people (procurement officials, installers, managers, and operators) while performing specific tasks involving the CKMS.

A draft Framework was published by NIST for comment in June 2010 and again in April 2012. The attached table of proposed Profile requirements was drafted for public comment and for discussion by participants of the CKM Workshop scheduled for September 10-11. Details of the workshop are available at http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/ct/ckm_workshop_2012.cfm.

An initial attempt at defining Profile requirements is presented below in tabular form. Public-comment reviewers and workshop participants are invited to comment on these tables and are requested to provide answers to the following questions:

1) What topics are fundamental to the design and operation of a CKMS?
2) Are the topics, requirements, and desirable features proposed in the table appropriate?
3) What requirements should be satisfied in every Federal CKMS system?
4) What are cost-effective security augmentations to a Federal CKMS?
5) What attributes need default values for establishing interoperability among CKMS?
6) What attributes should be considered "nice-to-have" in the future?
7) What requirements for interoperability among CKMS, communications, secure computer applications, and user-CKMS interfaces are desirable and cost effective?

The Profile Table for a U.S. Federal Government CKMS

Profile CKMS topics, requirements and features are presented in the following table, and should be used as follows:

1) Obtain a copy of the Framework to review a topic and its CKMS design requirement(s). The section numbers in column 1 correspond with those of the CKMS Framework.

2) The section topics in column 2 are taken from the Framework and discussed there. The Framework requirements (denoted as FR:x.y, where x is the section, and y is a section topic requirement) relate to that topic as discussed in the Framework.

3) Column 3 contains the base requirements for implementation in all Federal CKMS. Interoperability requirements are shown in parentheses.

4) The augmented requirements in column 4 are those required for implementation in Federal CKMS having higher security needs. Those specific to an Agency may appear in the procurement documents of an agency or Federal contractor. Interoperability requirements are shown in parentheses.

5) The future features in column 5 are desirable features or "nice-to-haves"; for example, for those CKMS where such features are required and affordable.

6) The Requirements Table will be modified, based on public comments and workshop discussions. These requirements will then be integrated into the Profile and issued for public comment.

Frame-work Section (FR:x.y)	Topic/Feature	Base Requirements (Interoperability)	Augmented Requirements (Interoperability)	Desirable CKMS Features for the Future
Section 1, FR:1.1	Framework and Profile Requirements	Base Requirements for CKMS Design and Implementation	Augmented Requirements for CKMS Design and Implementation	Features to consider for Future CKMS implementations
Section 2.1, FR:2.1	Cryptographic algorithms and key sizes	NIST-approved algorithms and key sizes per SP 800-131A		Multi-algorithm capability
Section 2.1, FR:2.2	Security strength of algorithms	112 bits of security minimum (112)	128 bits of security minimum (128)	Scalable security strength capability
Not covered in the Framework	Key and metadata sensitivity	Low, Moderate or High (Low)	Moderate or High (Moderate)	Multi-Level Security: Low, Moderate, and High
Section 3.1	Key Mgmt. for Networks, Applications, and Users	CKM for low, moderate or high confidentiality and integrity for selected applications (Low)	CKM for moderate or high confidentiality and integrity for selected applications (Moderate)	Multi-domain CKM supported, multi-level policy negotiation, enforce policy negotiated for application

Frame-work Section (FR:x.y)	Topic/Feature	Base Requirements (Interoperability)	Augmented Requirements (Interoperability)	Desirable CKMS Features for the Future
Section 3.2 FR:3.4	Conformance to Standards	Conform to applicable NIST security Standards and Recommendations.		All CKMS services use applicable Federal, National, and International security and interoperability standards
Section 3.3 FR:3.10	Ease of Use	Simple user interfaces; easily managed, monitored ,and audited security services and functions; prevention or detection of user errors; easy recovery from a security breach		User-CKMS and CKMS-CKMS Interfaces use the same commands and parameters for the same services throughout all security domains
Section 4 FR:4.4 FR:4.5	Security Policies: Required security policies	CKMS Security Policy and Cryptographic Module Security Policy	Base + Information Security Policy, Domain Security Policy	Supports Multiple Domain Security Policies; a CKMS can negotiate a new security policy for an application, based on policies from more than one security domain

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Section 4.6, FR:4.6	Accountability	Required for all roles except the user role	Required for all roles	Personal Accountability for all activities within the CKMS while preserving anonymity and personal privacy
		Identify entities (e.g., devices, users), verify entity authorization, detect unauthorized access, report requests for unauthorized access, and restrict CKMS use to authorized entities performing authorized activities		
Section 4.7 FR:4.7	Anonymity, Unlinkability and Unobservability	Optional	CKMS assures that keys cannot be linked to an authorized entity when viewed from outside CKMS	Provided for entities using keys and metadata in accordance with a Domain Security Policy
Section 4.8, FR:4.14	Laws, Rules and Regulations: Intended use	US Federal Agency and Contractor facilities in US	Base + US Federal Facilities in Canada, Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand.	Global US Federal Facilities
Section 4.9	Security Domains	Support the CKMS Security Policy that is based on one security domain policy		Support the CKMS security policy and multiple domain policies
Section 4.9.3 FR:4.18	Obtaining Assurances	Manual evaluation of security policies		Automated assistance of security policy evaluation

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Section 4.9.7 FR:4.21	Multi-Level Security Domains	Optional		Supports multi-level security domains
Section 4.9.8, FR:4.24	Upgrading and downgrading	Optional	Only with security administrator approval	Automated support of administrative negotiation of a security level
Section 5, FR:5.1	Roles and Responsibilities: Required roles	System Administrator, Cryptographic Officer, Key Owner, Audit Administrator, Key Custodian, System User		System Authority, Domain Authority, Registration Agent, Key Recovery Agent, CKMS Operator
Section 5.1 FR:5.2	Roles and Responsibilities: Role separation	Audit Administrator can assume no additional role other than a System User		
Section 6.1, FR:6.1	Key Types	At least one key type for performing a cryptographic function on data	At least two key types: one operates on data while the other operates on keys and/or metadata	All Key types needed to support multiple security domains as per policies

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Section 6.2.1, FR:6.2	Metadata Elements: Selection and how associated with the key	Support of elements as specified in design (Application-dependent) Cryptographic or trusted-process association with the key	Key label, key identifier, key owner identifier, crypto.alg. using the key, schemes or modes of operation, parameters, key type, applications for the key, parent key, key sensitivity, access control list, date-times/usage count, and revocation reason. (All Application-dependent) Cryptographic association with the key	Security domain ID for each element supported
Section 6.2.1	Metadata Elements: Secret and private key protections	Confidentiality and integrity protection; integrity verified when received	Base+ source authentication	Integrity is verified before loading into crypto module prior to use
Section 6.2.1	Metadata Elements: Public key protection	Integrity verified when received		Integrity is verified before loading into crypto module prior to use

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Section 6.2.1,	Metadata Elements: Metadata protection	Confidentiality protection if sensitive; integrity verified when received	Base+ source authentication	Integrity is verified before loading into crypto module prior to use
Section 6.2.1, FR:6.10	Metadata Elements: Time source	NIST time source; verified daily	NIST time source; verified hourly	NIST time source; verified as per domain policy
Section 6.2.1, FR:6.12	Metadata Elements: Time stamp	Capability for using an approved time-stamping authority; use for activate key, deactivate key revoke key, destroy a key, and recover a key.	Base+ generate or establish a key, derive or update a key, destroy metadata, backup and archive a key and its metadata, recover a key's metadata, manually enter and output a plaintext key or key split from a crypto-module, validate domain parameters and public key, validate a key pair, and validate the possession of a private key	Capability for providing a Time Stamp for: Suspend and reactivate a key, renew a public key, associate a key with its metadata, modify metadata, delete metadata, list metadata, store operational key and its metadata, validate certification path, validate a symmetric key, perform a function using a key, and manage the trust anchor store

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Section 6.2.2, FR:6.13	Required Key and Metadata Information: Random number generation	Any NIST-approved RNG per SP 800-131A	SP 800-90 RBG	
Section 6.2.2 FR:6.13	Required Key and Metadata Information: Disclosure and modification protections	Cryptographic when outside a cryptomodule		
Section 6.2.2 FR:6.13	Required Key and Metadata Information: Assurances	Obtain key and domain parameter assurances using approved methods		
Section 6.3, FR:6.15	Key Lifecycle States and Transitions: Required states	Active, revoked and compromised	Base+ destroyed	Pre-activated, deactivated, suspended, reactivated after suspension

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Section 6.4, FR:6.17	Key and Metadata Management Functions	Generate key, deactivate key, register owner, revoke key, associate a key with its metadata, list key metadata, destroy key and metadata, establish a key, validate keys and domain parameters (as appropriate), recover key and metadata, and perform a cryptographic function using a key	Base+ backup key and metadata,	Activate key, renew a key, modify metadata, archive key and metadata, suspend and re-activate a key, establish key and metadata for a negotiated new security domain
Section 6.4.1 FR:6.19	Generate Key	Use NIST-approved methods		
Section 6.4.5	Revoke Key	Required, with reason for revocation		
Section 6.4.9	Destroy a key	Use approved methods		

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Section 6.5	Crypto. Key and/or Metadata Security: Key and metadata storage outside a cryptomodule	Store secret and private keys and sensitive metadata outside a crypto module encrypted and with an integrity code; verify integrity after retrieval from storage	Base + authenticate and verify authorization of entity retrieving keys and metadata from storage	
Section 6.6FR:6.79 FR:6.82	Crypto. Key and/or Metadata Security: During key establishment	Any NIST-approved scheme (SP 800-56A key agreement: C(2,0) EC (curve P-256); SP 800-56B key transport: KTS-OAEP)	Any NIST – approved scheme (SP 800-56A key agreement: C(1, 2, ECC CDH) with curve P-256 SP 800-56B key transport: KTS-KEM-KWS	SP 800-56A key agreement: C(2,2) DH and MQV; SP 800-56B key agreement: KAS2
Section 6.6.3, FR:6.84	Key Confirmation	Optional	Required	
Section 6.6.4, FR:6.86 Also Section 7, FR:7.2	Key Establishment Protocols	Any NIST-approved or allowed protocol (common protocol required for interoperability)		Automated domain policy negotiation protocol (to be developed)
Section 6.7.1, FR:6.89	Restricting Access to Key and Metadata Management Functions	Single-factor authentication on security-relevant functions	Multi-factor authentication on security-relevant functions	Personal authentication and function authorization

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Section 6.7.2, FR:6.94	Restricting Cryptographic Module Entry and Output of Plaintext Keys	Encryption or key splitting optional for secret and private keys - i.e., plaintext entry and output allowed.	Encryption or key splitting required for secret and private keys.	
Section 6.7.4, FR:6.97	Multi-party Control	Optional	Multi-party control on CA and/or KDC keys	Domain administrators for multi-domain services
Section 6.7.5, FR:6.99	Key Splitting	Optional		
Section 6.8.1, (no specific FR) and Section 6.8.3, FR:6.107	Key Compromise: Recovery	Change compromised key to the compromised state; key revocation and rekey of all keys affected by a compromise; audit logging of the revocation and rekey processes;		
Section 6.8.2, FR:6.106 and Section 6.8.3, FR:6.107	Metadata Compromise: Replacement of sensitive metadata	Metadata revocation and replace both key and metadata	Base + audit of compromise;	
Section 6.8.4, FR:6.108	Cryptographic Module Compromise: Recovery	FIPS 140-2 Level 2 tamper evidence	FIPS 140-2 Level 3 tamper evidence and protection	FIPS 140-2, Level 4 tamper evidence and protection

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Section 6.8.5, FR:6.113	Computer System Compromise Recovery	Detect, report and analyze the problem; install system upgrades and perform system tests	Base + take compromised part of CKMS offline to repair and test	Automated detection and reporting of errors and return to known secure state
Section 6.8.6, FR6:115 b)	Network Security Controls and Compromise Recovery	Block unauthorized protocols ; install security patches and upgrades	Base + firewalls on networked computers	SCAP security status checking and perform recommended remediation
Section 6.8.7, FR:6.117	Personnel Security Compromise Recovery	Enforce personal accountability; minimize consequences of any role compromise; provide role separation and role backup	Base + annual audit of personnel security logs and whenever personnel security compromise is suspected; annual review of potential compromise consequences	Automated annual security training of all personnel with signed policy acceptance by each person
Section 6.8.8, FR:6.118	Physical Security Compromise Recovery	Controlled physical access to CKMS devices; Recovery procedures	Base + two-factor physical access control.	

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Section 7, FR:7.1	Interoperability and Transitioning	As required for supported applications; use an interoperable default; make and use transition plans, as needed		Protocols for establishing equivalence of security domains; key management interoperability for multi-domain transactions
Section 7, FR:7.2	Interoperability and Transitioning: Symmetric encryption using block ciphers	Any NIST-approved symmetric algorithms per SP 800-131A (AES-128)		
	Block cipher modes	SP 800-38 (Encryption only: CBC; Message authentication only: CMAC; Authenticated encryption: CCM; Key wrapping: CCM)		
	Hash algorithm	Any FIPS-approved hash function per SP 800-131A (SHA-256)		
	Hash-based message authentication	FIPS 198 (HMAC-SHA-1)		
	Key Agreement	SP 800-56A (C(2e,0s) EC with curve P-256; concatenation KDF with SHA-256)	SP 800-56A (C(1e, 2s, ECC CDH) with curve P-256; concatenation KDF with SHA-256)	

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Section 7 (contd.) FR:7.2	Key Transport	SP 800-56B (KTS-OAEP; concatenation KDF with SHA-256)	SP 800-56B (KTS-KEM-KWS; concatenation KDF with SHA-256)	
	Key Derivation (from a pre-shared key)	SP 800-108 (HMAC in counter mode with SHA-1)		
	Digital Signature	Any NIST-approved digital signature algorithm per SP 800-131A (ECDSA with curve P-256)		ECDSA with curve P-364
Section 8	Security Controls	Enforce CKMS Policy Sanctions	Base + multi-person control of critical system functions	Enforce Domain Policy Sanctions
Section 8.1	Physical Security Controls	Physical protection; access control for CKMS devices, keys and metadata.	Base + access control to CKMS facilities.	
Section 8.1 FR:8.2	Physical Security Controls: Protection of crypto. devices and components	FIPS 140-2, Level 2 physical protections in crypto modules.	FIPS 140-2, Level 3 physical protections in crypto modules.	FIPS 140-2, Level 4 physical protection in cryptomodules
		Physical protection of computer systems and communication end-points.		

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Section 8.2.1, FR:8.3 and FR:8.5	Operating System Security	Specification of requirements for secure operation. The following hardening features of FR:8.5: a) removal of all non-essential software programs & utilities; d) limiting user accounts to only those needed for essential operations; f) replacing default passwords and keys; g-i) disabling non-required services and data ports	Base + use of operating systems that provide protections to sensitive keys and metadata while resident in the computer for all multi-user components. All hardening principles of FR 8.5 are required unless specifically exempted by the CKMS owner.	Automated negotiation of Trusted System features to be used for a transaction
Section 8.2.2, FR:8.6	Individual CKMS Device Security	Implement and support the security controls as specified by each device's design	Provide security features a) to f) in Section 8.2.2 unless specifically exempted by the system-owning authority.	Configurable by system administration with approval of the system authority; dynamically configurable, based on domain security policy(ies)

Frame-work Section (FR:x.y)	Topic/Feature	Base Requirements (Interoperability)	Augmented Requirements (Interoperability)	Desirable CKMS Features for the Future
Section 8.2.3, FR:8.8	Malware Protection	Implement and support time and event-driven malware scanning[1]. Update software when available.	Base + rootkit detection software. Software integrity verified upon installation and periodically.	Configurable malware monitoring
Section 8.2.4, FR:8.10	Auditing and Remote Monitoring	Auditing of specified security-related events. Report events to audit administrator. Audit capability and audit log protected from unauthorized modification.	Base + SCAP compatible	
Section 8.3, FR:8.15	Network Security Control Mechanisms	Section 8.3 items a) through f), as selected	All items in Section 8.3 items a) through f) required, unless exempted by owning authority Mechanisms in physically secure locations. Configured by authorized entities.	

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[1] Daily scan for Virus, Spyware, and other Malware. Scan of portable data storage media before it is opened for CKMS access. Scan of software modules and data files for Malware before they become accessible. Weekly checks for new updates of the Malware protection software. Weekly update and use of the known-Malware databases and system repair updates.

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Section 8.4, FR:8.19	Cryptographic Module Controls	FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or above	FIPS 140-2 Level 3 or above	FIPS 140-2 Level 4
Not covered in the Framework	Control Selection Process	Compliance with FIPS 199, FIPS 200, and SP 800-53		Configurable by system administrator with approval of the system authority; dynamically configurable, based on domain security policy(ies)
Section 9, FR:9.1, FR:9.2, FR:9.3, FR:9.4, FR:9.5, FR:9.6, and FR:9.7.	Testing and System Assurances: By vendor, third-party, and system, procurement authority for scalability, functionality, security, and interoperability	Vendor and third-party testing; procurement acceptance testing; functional, and security testing; interoperability testing; self testing during operation. All must provide acceptable test results		Functional and operational testing of multi-domain policy negotiation and enforcement
Not covered in Framework	Ease-of-Use Testing	Demonstrate operation and use of CKMS for all users; demonstrate correct operation and failures of system with responses	Base + built-in demo of system operation	Third-party evaluation of usability prior to procurement.

Frame-work Section (FR:x.y)	Topic/Feature	Base Requirements (Interoperability)	Augmented Requirements (Interoperability)	Desirable CKMS Features for the Future
Section 9.7 FR:9.8	Limitations of Testing: E.g., cannot test for all potential failures nor unexpected failures	Test CKMS operations within the expected environment[2] prior to procurement.		Automatically test periodically for negotiation of equivalent, compatible, and incompatible policies
Section 9.8.1 FR:9.11	Configuration Management	CKMS under device-level configuration management during implementation, procurement, installation, operation, maintenance, and disassembly. Record make, model and version for all devices of the CKMS.		Automated Configuration Management throughout CKMS lifetime; automatically track and record CKMS device IDs and locations.
Section 9.8.2	Secure Delivery	Verification that the procured products are those actually delivered. Unrequested delivery is detected. Tracking and verification of successful delivery in the expected time period.	Base + detection and/or prevention of tampering of CKM system, devices, or components during delivery	

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[2] Number of users, number of keys, temperature, communications and electrical service.

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Section 9.8.3 FR:9.13	Development and Maintenance Environment Security	Implement physical security, separation of duties, computer security controls, network security controls, controls for ensuring the trustworthiness of implementation tools and the resulting hardware, software, and maintenance data as specified by the design.	Base + Personnel security[3]. Multi-person control of critical security parameters (e.g., CA certificates and keys) when implementing high-level security CKMS. Cryptographic security control of the integrity of software and critical data.	
Section 9.8.4	Flaw Remediation Capabilities	Implement capabilities for detecting[4] and expeditiously reporting potential and detected flaws[5] to developers and managers. Implement and use capabilities for installing authorized fixes quickly and then testing for adequacy as specified by the design.		Automated initiation of flaw detection and reporting, based on dynamic risk monitoring
Section 10	Disaster Recovery	24 hour recovery from backup of the CKMS	12 hour recovery from backup of the CKMS	Fifteen Minute recovery from backup of the CKMS

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[3] Clearances and background checks, where appropriate, for developers, testers, and maintainers.

[4] E.g., known-answer tests, error detection codes, anomaly detection and functional testing.

[5] E.g., status-report messages.

Frame-work Section (FR:x.y)	Topic/Feature	Base Requirements (Interoperability)	Augmented Requirements (Interoperability)	Desirable CKMS Features for the Future
Section 10.1 FR: 10.1	Facility Damage	Provide, maintain, and test environmental, fire, and physical protection and procedures for recovering from disasters at primary, backup and archive facilities as specified in the design; test yearly; examine procedures every five years.	Base + Test at least every 6 months to determine that these mechanisms and procedures work as expected. Backup facility operational within 12 hours. Potentially compromised keys revoked and replaced within 12 hours. Examine procedures every two years.	CKMS automatically transfers to backup upon detection of electrical, water, or facility failure or significant physical damage. Verify monthly that backup capability works properly. Verify that compromised keys are revoked and replaced as per domain policy
Section 10.2 FR:10.2	Utility Service Outage	Provide and maintain computer-facility industry-recommended electrical, water, sanitary, heating, cooling and air filtering requirements for the primary and all backup and archive facilities as specified in the design	Provide and maintain industry recommended high-availability utility services, including electrical, water, sanitary, heating, cooling and air filtering requirements for the primary and all backup and archive facilities	CKMS automatically transfers to backup upon detection of utility services damage. Verify monthly that backup capability works properly.

Frame-work Section (FR:x.y)	Topic/Feature	Base Requirements (Interoperability)	Augmented Requirements (Interoperability)	Desirable CKMS Features for the Future
Section 10.3 FR:10.3	Communication and Computation Outage	Provide computation and communication redundancy needed to recover within 24 hours.	Provide computation and communication redundancy needed to recover within 12 hours	Provide automatic switch-over to backup computation and communications within 15 minutes
Section 10.4 FR:10.4	System Hardware Failure	Provide backup and recovery from hardware failures upon detection. Perform initial and yearly tests of redundant systems	Base + Repair or replace failed hardware within 12 hours. Perform periodic tests of redundant hardware at least once per month	Maintain backup of each CKMS sub-system for the primary and backup facilities. Return to secure state within 15 minutes
Section 10.5 FR:10.5 FR:10.6 FR:10.7	System Software Failure	Verify software integrity after loading into memory and before use. Follow CKMS security policy for backup and recovery from software failures. Immediately backup and verifiy software after returning the CKMS to a secure state. Test software after repair and before use.	Base + verify correctness of the security-critical software using known-answer tests. Perform daily backups.	Verify correct operation of CKMS software by performing supported key management functions in both the primary and backup facilities and verifying that the results are identical

Frame-work Section (FR:x.y)	Topic/Feature	Base Requirements (Interoperability)	Augmented Requirements (Interoperability)	Desirable CKMS Features for the Future
Section 10.6 FR:10.10	Cryptographic Module Failure	Repair or replace failed modules and verify that authorized personnel perform these repairs and replacements self tests		Automatically switch CKMS processing to a backup capability upon detection and verification of a cryptographic module failure.
Section 10.7 FR:10.11 FR:10.12	Corruption of Keys and Metadata	Use mechanisms to detect corrupted stored and transmitted keys and metadata, report corruption to the system administrator, and restore or replace the corrupted keys and metadata. Report to all affected users.	Base + train and then test personnel every six months in performing recovery and replacement processes.	Automatically report detected security-critical CKMS failures to all potentially affected users and initiate recovery and repair procedures.
Section 11.1 FR:11.2 FR:11.2	Full Security Assessment	Full CKMS assessment before initial operation and after major system change or major compromise		Security assessment of CKMS modifications after adding new security domain support. Periodic security assessments.

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Section 11.1.1 FR:11.3	Review of Third-Party Validations	CAVP and CMVP validation of crypto. algorithms and modules.	Base + NIAP/CC validation of non-crypto and hardware.	CKMS and its sub-systems and devices validated by a third party for implementation of its design and for conformance to SP 800-130 and SP 800-152.
Section 11.1.2 FR:11.5	Architectural Review of System Design	Perform an architectural review of CKMS design, implementation, installation, and configuration prior to initial deployment and after a major system redesign using a team having the required skill set.		
Section 11.1.3 FR:11.7	Functional and Security Testing	CKMS- designer and owner-specified functional and security tests before initial operation performed by the vendor, the owner, and a trusted third party (trusted by the Fed. Govt.); perform CKMS usability testing	Base + annual functional and security verification tests.	Automatically test all CKMS services for security and functionality that are intended to interact with other security domains and report results to security domain administrators

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Section 11.1.4 FR:11.9	Penetration Testing	Perform penetration testing of CKMS and report the results to CKMS administrator.	Base + test CKMS sub-systems and devices before deployment and annually thereafter -see 9.6.	Perform automated penetration testing during policy negotiation among multiple CKMS in different domains.
Section 11.2	Periodic Security Review	Bi-annual reviews	Annual reviews	Automated periodic monitoring of security-critical processes. Automated security testing after two or more CKMS negotiate a new security policy for data from different security domains
Section 11.3 FR:11.14 FR:11.15	Incremental Security Assessment	Assess the security of the component whenever a change is made in that component. Perform functional and security testing of the affected component before making the change operational.	Perform an incremental assessment of the CKMS whenever a change is made. Perform full functional and security testing before making the change operational.	Automatically perform random security tests for critical CKMS functions and report failures to affected domain security administrators

Frame-work Section (FR:x.y)	Topic/Feature	Base Requirements (Interoperability)	Augmented Requirements (Interoperability)	Desirable CKMS Features for the Future
Section 11.4 FR:11.16	Security Maintenance	Perform an incremental security assessment before and after changes are made; report reasons for the change, discovered security defects, results of the assessment, and the corrective actions taken	Base + perform security state verification following any routine or emergency maintenance on a CKMS or its devices	Automatically perform security verification on policy enforcing CKMS after a new policy is negotiated between two mutually suspicious but cooperating entities in different security domains
Section 12	Crypto Technology Review	Compare CKMS design and implementations with latest CKMS technology and new products every two years		Review CKMS-relevant technology in all countries participating in security policy enforcement with United States-based CKMS